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MICHAEL J. DOANE' and PAUL W. MACAVOY"

Transmission Access Pricing and
"Non-bypassable" Competitive
Transition Charges
ABSTRACT
The vertical divestiture of electric utilities has raised a number of
important economic policy issues. The two most criticalissues are
(1) the ability of the incumbentfirm to recover the cost of its past
investment and (2) the pricingof the incumbent 'sbottleneck inputs
that may also be used by its new rivals. Regulatory agencies have
addressed the first problem generally by establishingcompetitive
transition charges, but have addressed the second problem
inconsistently on a case-by-case basis. The difference in regulatory
response strategieshas given rise to attempts by municipalitiesto
avoid cost recovery charges by gainingspecial wholesale pricesfor
bottleneck services. We demonstratethat the correct pricingrules to
resolve these issues are one and the same. The rule that governs the
efficient pricingof inputs sold to competitorsalso results in thefirm
recovering the cost of its past investment. If access is mispriced,
access is priced
transitioncharges will be "bypassable." However, if
correctly, only efficient bypass will occur and cost recovery will be
automatic.
"The name of the game is bypass. We're going to bleed the monopolies."
Walter Holman, Destec Power Marketing (California Journal, January
1996)
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 29, 1995, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC" or "Commission") announced its intention to promote competition
in wholesale power markets by ensuring nondiscriminatory access to the
electric power transmission grid. FERC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
commonly referred to as the "Mega-NOPR," proposed to require all electric
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utilities under its jurisdiction to file "open-access tariffs" to buyers of
wholesale electric power.1
NOPR, FERC confronted the issue of whether and how to
compensate incumbent utilities for investment to provide service made
redundant by the proposed rulemaking. The Commission defined stranded
costs as:
any legitimate, prudent and verifiable cost incurred by a
public utility or a transmitting utility to provide service to: (i)
a wholesale requirements customer that subsequently
becomes, in whole or in part, an unbundled wholesale
transmission services customer of such public utility or
transmitting utility or (ii) a retail customer, or newly created
wholesale power sales customer, that subsequently becomes,
in whole or in part, an unbundled wholesale transmission
services2 customer of such public utility or transmitting
utility.
In this context, stranded costs can best be understood as a transition
payment incurred as a result of introducing competition into a previously
regulated industry. 3

1. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Recover Stranded:
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662 (1995)
(FERC) (hereinafter "Mega-NOPR"). While the Mega-NOPR dealt only with
stranded costs caused by wholesale wheeling, the FERC noted the 85% of
stranded costs would likely be due to retail wheeling.
2. Id. at 17,701.
3. The FERC's definition is in essential agreement with that offered by Professors
Baumol, Joskow, and Kahn, who defined stranded costs as:
past investments, contractual commitments, and deferred recoveries of
expenses, previously reviewed and approved (and, in some cases, mandated)
by regulators, that have not yet been fully recovered by the utility companies,
and that could not be recovered in a fully competitive market because
competitors would bear no such burdens. See William J.Baumol, et al., The
Challengefor Federal and State Regulators: Transitionfrom Regulation to Efficient
Competition in Electric Power, Appendix A of the Comments of the Edison
Electric Institute in Response to Mega-NOPR, Docket No. RM94-7-000 (June
1994). Seen in this way, the transition of regulated industries to more
competitive structures parallels the efforts of Eastern European countries to
introduce competition into their previously command-oriented economies.
Not surprisingly, massive capital investments undertaken by prior regimes
are now essentially worthless, the stranded costs having been paid for by
wage earners. See OuvER BLANcHARD, KwNm FROor &JEI;Y SACHS, EDs.,
THE TRANSmON iN EASrERN EuRoPE, VOL. 1, CouNRY STUDIES; VOL. 2,
RESTRUCrRING (1994).

Winter 1997]

TRANSMISSION ACCESS PRICING

Shortly after the Commission released its Mega-NOPR, the
California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") initiated a proceeding to
restructure that state's retail power market. On December 20, 1995, the
CPUC released its restructuring decision (whose subsequent modification
is known as the "Policy Decision") which offered California consumers
greater choice in purchasing electric power.4 Among other changes, the
Policy Decision made it possible for California retail customers to obtain
open and nondiscriminatory transmission access. As did its federal
counterpart, the CPUC addressed the problem of stranded costs and
determined that all retain customers of record on or after December 20,1995
would be responsible for paying a "non-bypassable" competitive transition
charge ("CTC") whether or not such customers continued to take service
from the incumbent utility or pursued other options.
Following the CPUC Decision, several municipalities initiated
actions to avoid stranded cost payments. The Modesto Irrigation District
("Modesto" or "District"), in combination with Destec Power Marketing
("Destec"), proposed to serve Pacific Gas & Electric Company's ("PG&E's")
retail customer, Praxair, Inc., using power supplied by Destec based on the
premise it could avoid competitive transition charges. In a second example,
the City of Palm Springs filed an application requesting transmission
service under section 211 of the Federal Power Act. The application would
make that municipality a reseller of power transmitted by Southern
California Edison Company ("Edison") or a designated partner and, as
such, able to avoid Edison's competitive transition charges.
The Modesto and Palm Springs proposals have important
implications for implementing any transition charge scheme. Many large
industrial customers own substations that could be sold to local municipals;
these municipals then could transmit the power so as to avoid having to pay
stranded costs on grounds that as municipals are not subject to rate
regulations. In PG&E's service territory alone there are approximately 100
substations that could be sold to Modesto. Not surprisingly, the District is
negotiating with other California cities, public agencies, and private firms
to provide power. Other communities have expressed interest in Palm
Springs' proposal as it would allow them to bypass the utility's rate

4. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's Proposed Policies Governing
Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Reforming Regulation, Decision 95-12063 (Cal. P.U.C., Dec. 20,1995) as Modified by D. 96-01-009 (Jan. 10,1996).
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(municipalize) without condemning the distribution system of the franchise
utility. As such, these proposals have been labeled "muni lite."'
The possibility of such a side transaction gives rise to "bypassable"
stranded cost charges. We show "bypassable" conditions are not in the
public interest because they create incentives for entry that raises the total
costs of providing electric power, a cost consumers ultimately would have
to pay. We demonstrate that "non-bypassable" transmission access are
enforceable only if transmission access is priced efficiently. Efficient access
prices are those that permit the incumbent supplier and its new rivals to
compete on an equal cost basis. That access pricing rule permits efficient
entry into wholesale and retail power markets and allows stranded cost
recovery to be enforced during the transition period from regulated
monopoly to competition. We note that this rule has been applied to solve
analogous pricing problems involving railroad trackage rights and access
to local telephone networks.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the
rationale for stranded cost recovery and summarize FERC and CPUC cost
recovery mechanisms. In Section In we describe the bypass proposals of
Modesto Irrigation District and Palm Springs. In Section W we describe
efficient access pricing and its relationship to cost recovery. Conclusions are
presented in Section V.
IL THE RATIONALE FOR STRANDED COST RECOVERY
A. The Problem of Stranded Costs in the Electric Industry
Electric power has long been supplied by large, vertically integrated
utilities. These utilities own and operate generation, transmission, and
distribution facilities and sell, as a bundled service, delivered power to
wholesale and retail customers. While there are over 3,500 separate electric
systems in the United States, the largest 200 provide approximately 90
percent of the industry's generating capacity and serve nearly 80 percent of
final customers.6 In contrast, the remaining 3,300 systems own little or no
generation or transmission facilities; instead, they function as distributors
of electric energy purchased at wholesale.

5. Such proposals have been advanced by municipalities in New Jersey (Aberdeen and
Salem), Virginia (Falls Church), and New Hampshire. See e.g. SCC Clarifies its Jurisdiction in
Falls church "Muni Lite" Effort, in ELECrRIC UTELrTY WEEK: 1995 at 19; and Suppliers are
"Champing at the Bit" as Second N.J. Town Eyes "MuniLite," PowER MARKETS WEEK: 1995 at
2.
6. See FEDERAL ENERGY EUTORy COMMSION, POWER POOuNG INTHE UNITED STATES

5 (1981).
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Federal regulation intervenes by licensing the operation of nonfederal hydroelectric projects on federal waterways and, most importantly,
authorizing the services and prices in the interstate transmission and sale
of power at wholesale. The Commission's jurisdiction over wholesale
electric rates covers approximately 28 percent of the industry's total
domestic sales. Remaining sales involve retail electric power subject to the
jurisdiction of state public utilities commissions.
Investor-owned utilities ("IOUs") undertake substantial irreversible
investments in plant and equipment to meet present and future demands
of their customers. These investments are not made in a vacuum, and it is
reasonable to assume that they take place at least under an implicit
arrangement known as the regulatory contract. 7 The scenario that is
envisioned is that a utility is granted an exclusive franchise to serve a
specific geographic and an opportunity to earn a "fair" return on prudently
incurred investments. The utility has to offer rates deemed "just and
reasonable" by regulation and accept a "duty" or "obligation" to serve.8 The
"fair" return on capital can be expressed as that return by which the present
value of the stream of future quasirents (i.e., revenues minus operating
costs) allowed by regulation exactly equals initial investment outlays." If
not, costs are "stranded." That occurs when the regulatory agency in an
unpredictable move changes the allowed rate of return, or eliminates part
of the earnings stream.10
There is near unanimity that the restructuring of the electric
industry through vertical divestiture will generate significant stranded
costs. According to one analyst, stranded costs "are as high as $200-$300
billion, versus total shareholder equity of $175 billion."11 Another analyst
estimates stranded costs will run "$30 to $40 billion per year for the next
several years assuming 100 percent retail access."" Not only are stranded
costs likely to be larger than the gross domestic product of Mexico, they

7. For a discussion of the regulatory contract, see J. GRGoRY SiAK & DANIEL F. SpULEER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINwGs AND THE BREACH OF REGULATORY CONTRACT, (1996), New York

University Law Rev., VoL 71, No. 4, at 851-999.
8. See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
9. Under rate-of-return regulation, the revenue earned by a utility in each period equals
the sum of its operating cost, depreciation, and a market (fair) rate of return applied to the
value of the rate base at the beginning of the period.
10. We define stranded cost as the value of the firm's present discounted earnings under
regulation less the value of the firm's present discounted earnings under competition.
11. Theresa Flaim, Stranded Investment-$300 Billion Anchor or "Tonya Harding" Issue?, 6
ELEC. J.17 (1994).
12. M. Kahal, An EconomicPerspectiveon Competition and the ElectricUtility Industry (Nov.
1994), prepared for the Electric Consumers' Alliance's Comments in Response to Mega-NOPR,
Docket No. RM94-7-OOO (June 1994).
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surpass total shareholder equity in every investor-owned utility in the
United States.
B. Who Should Pay?
In the Mega-NOPR, the FERC concluded that stranded costs should
not be borne by utilities' shareholders because that "could threaten the
stability of the industry and the service it provides... ." The Commission
took the position that stranded costs should be recovered by a "direct
assignment of stranded costs to the departing wholesale customer .... We
believe it only appropriate that the departing customer, and not the
remaining customers (or shareholders), bear its fair share of the legitimate
and prudent obligations that the utility undertook on that customer's
behalf."1 '
In its determination that stranded costs should be paid for by
departing customers, the FERC chose a different and more restricted set of
customers than was chosen in its restructuring of the natural gas industry.
In the implementation of Order No. 636, that unbundled gas field
purchasing from transportation, the FERC chose to recover stranded costs
from all open access transmission customers of interstate pipelines." The
distinction in sets of customers, departing customers in the electric industry
versus all open access transmission customers in the natural gas industry,
perhaps follows from unbundling in the gas industry being essentially
complete when Order No. 636 took effect. (By then, bundled sales
accounted for only 16 percent of throughput on interstate pipelines. 6) Since
84 percent of pipeline throughput was for customers who had stopped
receiving bundled sales, the FERC could not reasonably ask only the
remaining sixteen percent of customers to pay for costs stranded by the
Order. Further, its own open-access policies, starting with Order No. 436
seven years earlier, had encouraged customers to purchase unbundled
transportation services. As the Commission noted in its Mega-NOPR, "the
direct assignment approach for addressing stranded costs for the electric
industry differs from the approach eventually taken for the natural gas

13. Mega-NOPR, supra note 1, at 17,695.
14. Mega-NOPR, supra note 1, at 17,697. For an economic analysis of FERC's recovery
mechanism, see Michael J. Doane & Michael A. Williams, Competitive Entry into Regulated
Monopoly Service and the ResultingProblem of Stranded Costs, 3 HUMBS PAPERS ON PUBLIC POUCY:
Edinburgh 32-53.
15. FERC Order No. 636,57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (1992) and Subsequent FERC Order No. 636A, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,128 (1992), and FERC Order No. 636-B, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911.
16. See Michael J.Doane & Daniel F. Spulber, Open Access and the Evolution of the U.S. Spot
Marketfor NaturalGas, 37 J.L &ECON. 477-517 (1994).
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industry.... by the time the Commission issued Order No. 636, changes in
the natural gas industry had progressed to such a point that it was not
possible for the Commission to use a strict cost causation approach. Many
natural gas
customers had already left their historical pipeline suppliers'
17
systems."
In the Mega-NOPR, the key FERC determinant as to whether or not
a particular electric utility cost was stranded was whether it met the
"reasonable expectation standard." This standard requires that a utility
claiming that an exiting wholesale customer should be assigned stranded
costs must show that "it incurred stranded costs based on a reasonable
expectation that the customers would continue to receive bundled retail
service."18 Assuming that a utility can make a showing that it meets the
"reasonable expectation standard," the FERC addressed the issue of how
precisely to quantify the dollar value of the stranded costs.
The Mega-NOPR specifies that stranded costs should be quantified
by estimating the revenues lost by a utility as a result of a wholesale
customer's bypass. That is, stranded costs should be calculated by
"subtracting [1] the competitive market value of the power the customer
would have purchased from the utility (and the basic revenues from the
transmission service) had the customer continued to take service under its
contract from [2] the revenues that the customer would have paid the
utility."19
This approach can be compared with that of the California Public
Utilities Commission in dealing with the same cost issue in intrastate rate
setting. The CPUC summarized its stranded cost policy in its January 1996
Policy Decision:
We will authorize utilities to recover their retail transition
costs through an end-user surcharge that will apply to sales
to both retail procurement and utility customers on a utility
service territory basis. .

.

. In addition, we adopt the

[Memorandum of Understanding's] recommendation that
direct access customers must, as a condition of the utility's
retail distribution tariff, sign an agreement to pay their share
of transition costs and thereby waive any jurisdictional
objection they might otherwise raise in any forum. Allowing
utilities to recover legitimate transition costs is an essential

17. Mega-NOPR, supra note 1, at 17,697.
18. Id. at 17,708.
19. Id. at 17,704.
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element of the new market structure and precondition to
direct access. 0
The CPUC characterized its authorized charge to recover transition
costs as a "non-bypassable charge... for all customers who are retail
customers on or after the date of the decision, whether they continue to
take
2
bundled service from their current utility or pursue other options. ,
If investors are to be compensated for stranded costs, what
economic criteria should guide the design of rules for the recovery of
stranded costs? The first economic criterion is that of productive efficiency,
which states that the costs of any given output should be as low as possible.
Thus, for example, the costs of producing a given quantity of electric power
should be minimized. The second economic criterion is that of efficiency in
exchange (or "Pareto" optimality), which states that the allocation of
products among potential consumers is efficient if no consumer can be
made better off without necessarily making another worse off.'f But there
is an even more important operating standard-that relevant consumers
cannot avoid paying transition charges while other pay according to a ratesetting scheme that meets these requirements. Certain anomalies in the
regulatory process have allowed the development of loopholes that result
in an opportunity for such widespread evasion.
III. PROPOSALS TO EVADE STRANDED COST RECOVERY
CHARGES
A. The Modesto Irrigation District Proposal
In November 1994, PG&E and Destec Power Services entered into
a transmission service agreement (known as the Control Area and
Transmission Service Agreement, or "CATSA") that enabled wholesale
wheeling of electric power as permitted under the Federal Power Act.
Under the agreement, Destec purchases electric power from identified
generation sources, aggregates the power into pools, and sells it at
wholesale. PG&E transmits Destec's power over its transmission network
among designated transaction points.
In January 1996, Praxair, Inc., a retail customer of PG&E, sold an
electric substation (known as the Linde Substation) to the Modesto

20. Cal. P.U.C. Policy Decision, supra note 4, at 154.
21. Id. at 120.
22.

(1985).

WALTERNK

SON, MICROcONOMIc THEORY: BASIc Pi

es AND

Ex

NSoNS
610

Winter 1997]

TRANSMISSION ACCESS PRICING

Irrigation District* Earlier, Praxair had acquired the substation to convert
high-voltage electric power to a lower voltage for use in its manufacturing
facilities. The Linde Substation is located approximately 100 miles from
Modesto's service territory.
Destec asserts that Modesto's acquisition of the Linde Substation
creates a utility distribution system and transforms the substation from a
retail to a wholesale point. Since Destec seeks to supply electric power to
Praxair at the substation, it requests that PG&E provide transmission
service (under the November 1994 transmission agreement) from its
generation point to the substation.24
At the same time, given that the CPUC does not regulate Modesto's
retail rates,' Destec/Modesto can induce Praxair to leave PG&E by
undercutting the incumbent's retail price by the amount of the newly
established competitive transition charge. Recent statements by a Modesto
representative confirm this approach:
The other big issue that is hanging over the restructuring
process is what is sometimes called uneconomic assets or
stranded costs, and that's the costs that are associated with a
lot of things that probably wouldn't have been done if people
had the ability to view into the future, the nuclear power
contracts, some of the contracts with independent facilities,
the windmills, some of those types of things. And part of the
approach that the CPUC has taken up to now is that a
hundred percent of those costs have to be paid by the
customers before any savings can begin under direct access.
... The alternative that we offer, under current law, there's

23. The Modesto Irrigation District was organized in 1887 to provide water to farmers. It
began selling electricity in the 1920s using a hydroelectric power plant. Today it generates
electricity using hydro, gas, and coal plants, and purchases power from San Francisco's Hetch
Hetchy hydro-electric facility and other utilities. Modesto serves approximately 90,000 retail
customers in contrast to PG&E which serves 4.4 million customers. As a municipal, Modesto
qualifies for tax-exempt financing and is not obligated to purchase power from "qualifying
facilities" under PURPA legislation. In 1995, Modesto's system average electric rate was 7.7
cents per kWh. PG&E's system average electric rate was 11.6 cents per kWh.
24. Modesto's connection to PG&E is governed by a 1988 interconnection agreement that
specifies only one point of interconnection which is located adjacent to Modesto's retail service
territory. See Interconnection Agreement Between Pacific Gas and Electric Company and Modesto
IrrigationDistrict(1988) (on file with author).
25. Under California state law, the CPUC does not regulate the retail rates of irrigation
districts.
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no procedure in place to recover stranded costs on an
investor-owned facility to irrigation district transaction.2
The substance of this transaction would be a sale of power from
Destec to Praxair through Modesto. That sale would be preferable to that of
power purchased from PG&E because it would be cheaper by at least the
transition charge that is required in PG&E's price. To equalize the
alternatives, and preserve the transition payments, would require PG&E to
add the charge to its prices for transmission services.
B. The Palm Springs' Proposal
The City of Palm Springs ("Palm Springs" or "City") is a political
subdivision of the State of California and as such a chartered municipal
corporation. Palm Springs has owned and operated an electrical system
(known as the Palm Springs Electrical System, or "PSES") for thirteen years.
The PSES includes three generating plants and a 12 Kv distribution system
which allows the City to provide retail service to municipal facilities, and
a limited number of customers.' Palm Springs sells surplus power to
Edison and acquires from Edison standby electric service. The present load
of the PSES is 7,900 megawatts per year with peak demands of 1.55
megawatts and 1.30 megawatts in the summer and winter, respectively.
In the Palm Springs area, Edison owns and operates transmission,
subtransmission, and distribution facilities. Palm Springs granted Edison a
franchise to construct, install, and operate such facilities "for transmitting
and distributing electricity for any and all purposes... in, along, across,
upon, over, and under the streets within the City of Palm Springs."' Edison
provides retail electric service to most of the electric consumers located
within the Palm Springs city limits.
Palm Springs reqiests that Edison deliver electric power from PSES
power supply resources to multiple, low-voltage points of receipt. The
proposal is that at these receipt points, newly installed City-owned meters
would be "interposed between Edison's system and the facilities of all retail

26. Presentation of Christopher Mayer, Assistant General Manager of the Modesto
IrrigationDistrict, at the Oakdale City Council Meeting (Dec. 4,1995), at 16 (excerpt on file with
author).
27. In addition to certain municipal facilities, the PSES provides retail service to the
County of Riverside, an airline service provider at the municipal airport, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and various airlines which utilize the municipal airport.
28. Application of City of Palm Springs, California for an Order Requiring Transmission
Service Under Section 211 of the Federal Power Act (1996) (FERC) (hereinafter "Application"),
Docket No. TX96-7-000, at 18. Notice of Palm Springs' Application was published at 61 Fed.
Reg. 1038 (1996).
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customers within the City."1 ' Based on presentations by prospective power
suppliers (Enova, Enron, Illinova, PacificCorp, and Portland General
Electric), the City intends to select a partner with which to plan for the
expanded needs of the PSES, including power supply, ancillary services,
transmission service arrangements, metering, billing, customer service, etc.
Palm Springs estimates that the electrical load of the new PSES will initially
be 600,000 mWh per year with a peak demand of 150 MW. This represents
a one-hundred fold increase in PSES' capacity. In sum, Palm Springs would
be a municipal utility consisting solely of electric meters.
Palm Springs argues that it could provide retail electric service "at
rates significantly lower than those of Edison by acquiring the Edison
system inside the City's limits, obtaining various wholesale power supply
at conservatively estimated rates and replacing Edison as to sole supplier
of retail electric service in the City." -0In lieu of condemnation, Palm Springs
states it "wishes to expand the PSES by constructing only the minimal
additional facilities necessary to measure and deliver its electric power and
energy in connection with the services sought hereby." 31 Palm Springs'
Application goes on to state "the City's plan for expansion of the PSES, if
successful, will replace the existing monopoly on retail electric service in
Palm Springs with competition between Edison and the City for each and
every electric customer in Palm Springs."'
The success of Palm Springs' proposal rests on the price it pays
Edison for transmission and distribution services. Palm Springs requests
that charges for usage of distribution facilities be based on "system-wide
distribution costs" and Edison's transmission costs "properly allocable to
Palm Springs should be recovered through a transmission rate based on
average transmission costs, allocated to Palm Springs based on its load ratio
share of system-wide coincident peak demand."' The City's rationale for
expanding the PSES in this way is that it avoids the stranded cost payments
it would otherwise make to Edison. The City's Application states:
The Commission should determine whether Edison is entitled
to recover any stranded costs in its rate for transmission
service to the City. The Commission's determination should
preempt any application of a competitive transition charge
which might otherwise be authorized by the CPUC with
respect to the City or its electric customers. The Commission
should find Edison can have no reasonable expectation of
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id., Executive Summary at 2.
Application, supra note 28, at 6.

Id.
Application, supra note 28, at 7.
Id. at 93-94.
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protection against municipal competition under California
law.'
In sum, Palm Springs believes it has found a loophole in the
response strategies of the two agencies. It asserts FERC has jurisdiction over
stranded cost recovery for municipal wholesale customers, but since the
threat of municipalization has long existed the "reasonable expectation
standard" for cost recovery cannot be met.
IV. COMPETITIVE PARITY PRICING AND STRANDED COST
RECOVERY
Why do opportunities exist to avoid paying cost recovery charges?
The answer is: cost recovery charges are "bypassable" whenever
transmission (network) access is mispriced. Appropriately structured access
charges can be used to price bottleneck inputs efficiently and ensure the
recovery of stranded costs.
Whenever transmission access is not priced correctly, rent-seeking
behavior is promoted. That is, market participants use real resources in an
attempt to avoid paying this scarcity rent.ss Consumers suffer two losses
from rent seeking: the loss of consumers' surplus from the higher price and
the loss of output from the resources devoted to evasion. Consumers are
made worse off because evasion of stranded costs (1)results in cost shifting
to cover the foregone recovery of common costs and (2) induces inefficient
entry which raises average total costs.
Congress recognized the potential for this behavior when it crafted
Section 212(h) of the FPA to prevent "sham wholesale transactions" or
subterfuges to avoid the ban on retail wheeling through the creation of
"paper" purchasing corporations. As Senator Johnston, the sponsor of the
legislation in the Senate noted:
Such a subterfuge would occur, for example, if the XYZ Steel
Co.-interposed a paper purchasing corporation in front of
it-say the XYZ Steel Power Procurement Corp.-and claimed
that such a corporation was a legitimate wholesale purchaser
entitled to a transmission order under section 211.... The
"for the benefit language" is intended to prevent extended
interposition of paper purchasing corporations in front of the
initial one-i.e., the XYZ Steel Power Procurement Corp. in the

34. Application, supra note 28, at 94.
35. Economic rent is a payment to a factor in excess of what is necessary to keep it in its
present employment. For example, if a woman is earning $40,000 in her current job and her
next best alternative pays $35,000, the economic rent which she enjoys is $5,000.
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above example. Without the "for the benefit of" language, the
XYZ Steel Co. in the above example would simply be able to
interpose the XYZ Electric Purchasing Corp. in front of the
XYZ Steel Power Procurement Corp., which would stand in
front of the XYZ Steel Co., and still be
s able to circumvent the
ban on mandatory retail wheeling.
Legal arguments concerning who qualifies and who does not
qualify under Section 212(h) will likely be complex. Entrants can be
expected to build cases as to why they are legitimate wholesale entities. For
example, the Palm Springs' Application states:
The City is not a "paper municipal utility agency" and it is
not acting as a front for any end users or suppliers of
electricity with respect to this Application. Neither is the City
seeking to exploit a loophole in the Federal Power Act as a
means of getting into the electric utility business ....
Thus, the
City and the PSES are not what Congress had in mind when
it wrote the prohibition on sham wholesale transactions into
the Federal Power Act of 1992.-0

Incumbent utilities will, of course, present counter legal arguments.
We address the causes of evasive actions of this kind and show how to
reduce the incentive for such behavior through pricing access to
transmission correctly.
A. Competitive Parity Pricing
The rule that governs the pricing of inputs sold to competitors
should result in recovering the cost of its past investment. If access is priced
according to this rule, then competitive transition charges will be recovered
from this source of earnings just as if they would be from charges for the
power itself. Only efficient bypass will occur and cost recovery will be
automatic.
The pricing rule that achieves this outcome is known in the
technical economics literature as the efficient component pricing rule, and
also as competitive parity pricing ("CCP"). The competitive parity
designation is utilized here because it best captures the central concept.
Prices for accessing the supplying firm's product are established so that the
supplying firm and its new rivals compete on an equal cost basis. The rule

36. 138 Cong. Rec. S17566-01 at 323 (daily ed. October 8, 1992) (Statement of Senator J.
Bennett Johnston).
37. Application, supra note 28, at 94.
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states the input (access) price equals the input's per-unit incremental cost
plus all pertinent incremental opportunity CostS.3s That is:
input price = the input's direct incremental cost +
the opportunity cost resulting from the sale of the input
For the owner of the transport facility, opportunity costs can be
viewed as the foregone recovery of common costs resulting from the sale of
access alone to the competitor. The derivation of opportunity costs for the
most straightforward case, that of segmented transmission services, is
shown with reference to Figures One and Two. In Figure One, Utility X is
an integrated firm that provides transmission service over path A to C
through an intermediate point B.39 Utility Y seeks access to transmission
path A to B and to self-provide service from B to C.
The derivation of the competitive parity price for transmission
access over path A to B is shown in Figure Two. The analysis begins with
the integrated firm's price for bundled service, P0. At that price, Qo units of
service are demanded, and recovery of common costs ("RCC," also known
as contribution) equals Q0 (P0 - ICAB - IC Bc), where IC AB and IC Bc are the
average incremental costs of routes A-B and B-C, respectively. (For ease of
exposition, we assume ICAB = ICBc.) In Figure Two, opportunity cost is
represented by the area A. The correct price for service from A to B
preserves this contribution and is expressed algebraically as follows:
FAB =

ICAB +

(P0 - LIC), where EIC = ICAB + ICBc.

We call this calculation the "bottoms-up" approach because it
begins with the incremental costs of the service provided and adds to that
amount opportunity costs. 4° In our example, the optimal input price, PAB,
equals $8.00 (i.e., $2.00 + ($10.00 - $4.00)) and generates total revenue equal
to the sum of areas A plus C. The rule leaves the supplier indifferent
between granting access to the competitor and using the input for offering
bundled service itself as contribution equals area A in both cases.

38.

See William J.Baumol & J.Gregory Sidak, The Pricingof Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11
J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, TRANSMIsSION

YALE J. ON REG. 171,202 (1994); see also William

PRICING AND STRANDED Cosrs INTHE ELEcrluc PowER INDusTRY (1995).

39. The sequencing of the transmission path does not alter the pricing rule. That is, if
Utility X and Utility Y both provided transmission service over path A-B, and Utility Y sought
access over path B-C, the same pricing rule would apply.
40. Notice P0 - ,ICcan be expressed as RCC/Q 9 or the per-unit recovery of common costs.
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FIGuRE ONE
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The preservation of contribution solves the problem of attaining
productive efficiency. Setting the price of access equal to ICAB + (P0 - _IC),
ensures only efficient entry will occur. This can be seen by noticing that the
pricing rule can be equivalently expressed as PAB = P0 - ICsc.4 Thus, a new
entrant will profit by purchasing access if and only if it is the more efficient
provider, i.e., if the entrant's average incremental cost is less than the
incumbent's average incremental costs over route B-C. (In Figure Two, the
entrant's ICsc must be less than the incumbent's IC c,or $2.00.) The
entrant's profits will then equal the net resources that society saves by use
of the entrant rather than the incumbent. Simply put, competitive parity
pricing creates a "level playing field" that ensures efficient firms succeed
and inefficient firms fail in activity's strictly at the level where entry takes
place.
Another desirable feature of this methodology is that it is consistent
with the criterion that no party is made worse off by a change in policy,
while an opportunity exists to increase the welfare of other parties. This is
because these access prices "fit into" the existing rate structure. Regulated
rate structures are generally designed to meet certain policy goals, such as
the provision of the universal service and the maintenance of low and stable
rates to home consumers. These prices do not disorient the existing rate
structure or require a change in basic policy on rate structure.
If the pricing rule were employed to establish access charges for
transmission, there would be no need to establish separate competitive
transition charges for departing customers. Departing customers would not
be able to avoid paying stranded costs because their access provider would
pass on these costs in access charges they would inevitably pay. Cost
recovery charges for departing customers would be necessary only in the
limiting case of stand-alone entry, i.e., those situations in which access to the
utility's system was not required.
The establishment of such access charges has precedent in other
regulated industries. In fact, the rule was first applied in the railroad
industry more than a decade ago in a series of trackage rights cases.' In
these cases, the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") adopted the rule
to establish prices paid by an entrant railroad when accessing an
incumbent's track. Contemporaneously with the ICC's trackage rights
cases, the methodology was advanced in the natural gas pipeline industry

41. We refer to this calculation as the "tops down" method. The "bottoms up" and "tops
down" produce equivalent access prices.
42. See, e.g., ICC railroad rates cases known as Compensation I through IV,St. Louis S.W.
Ry.-Trackage Rights over Miss. Pac. R.R. - Kansas City to St. Louis, 1 I.C.C.2d 561 (1984), 4
I.C.C.2d 668 (1987), 5 I.C.C.2d 525 (1989), 8 I.C.C.2d 80 (1991).
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as a means to determine how pipeline transportation rates should be
established so as to deter bypass that duplicates existing network facilities.'
In telecommunications, the methodology was advanced for the pricing of
local network interconnection services in New Zealand. In October 1994, the
Privy Council of the House of Lords issued in its decision in Telecom
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd. v. Clear Communications Ltd., a
statement that the methodology was the preferred method for the
establishment of wholesale prices for an incumbent service provider's
network facilities. More recently, the Telecommunications Act of 1996
endorsed this rule in its provision for pricing wholesale services sold to
competitors."
B. Competitive Parity Pricing and the Modesto Irrigation District and
Palm Springs Proposals
As noted above, Modesto and Palm Springs both seek to avoid
competitive transition charges established by the CPUC. The municipals
intend to circumvent these charges by (1) classifying themselves as
municipal wholesale customers exempt from rate regulation and (2)
requesting access at "cost-based" rates. However, the economically
appropriate price of access would equal the direct average incremental cost
of access plus opportunity costs. We shall consider how rates would be
implemented in these two cases.
Modesto. The access price would equal the direct incremental cost
of the input provided to Modesto (i.e., transmission service from Destec's
generation sources to the Linde Substation) plus the per-unit contribution
embodied in Praxair's retail rate. This access charge promotes productive
efficiency as Modesto could profitably serve Praxair only if its incremental
costs of providing power (through Destec) and retail services (billing,
customer service, etc. through itself or Destec) were less than PG&E's
incremental costs for the same services. Modesto's entry would not strand
PG&E's costs because those costs would be recovered through Modesto's
access charge. The access price meets the Pareto improvement criterion in
that PG&E's remaining customers would not be made worse off. But if

43. See Testimony of Paul W. MacAvoy Before the FERC in Docket No. CP&5-437, Exhibit
SG-3 (1985); see also Paul W. MacAvoy, Supplemental Report of Dr. Paul W. MacAvoy on
Stranded Cost Issues, Before the FERC, Docket No. CP93-258-000 (1994).
44. The Act states "a State Commission shall determine wholesale rates on the basis of
retail rates charges to subscribers for the telecommunication services requested, excluding that

portion thereof attributable to any marketing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided
by the local exchange carrier." Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-104, §
252(d)(d), 110 Stat. 56.
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Modesto obtained transmission access from PG&E at a price equal to
PG&E's per-unit incremental cost, efficient entry would not result. For
example, Modesto profitably could serve Praxair if its costs exceeded
PG&E's as long as the differential was less than the per-unit contribution
embodied in Praxair's retail rate. This profit opportunity provides a strong
incentive for Modesto to seek entry without having cost parity never mind
a cost advantage.
Palm Springs. The proposal would make the municipality a reseller
of power purchased from a designated partner or Edison. Edison would be
required to deliver that power at multiple, low-voltage points of receipt.
The efficient access price for Palm Springs would equal the incremental cost
of transmission and distribution services plus the contribution embodied in
the Palm Springs' retail rates. Since Palm Springs intends to serve
residential, commercial, and industrial customers, separate transmission
tariffs would be specified for each customer class. If Palm Springs is a more
efficient retailer, it will displace sales by Edison. Otherwise, Palm Springs
could not profitably serve the retail customers within the city's limits.
This approach can be used to price different "wholesale" services
requested by municipalities. Consider the case where Palm Springs became
simply a marketer of Edison's power. That is, it requested Edison to sell
power to the City at various low-voltage points. The City then markets,
meters, bills, and services Edison's former retail customers. Using the "tops
down" method, the correct Edison wholesale price to Palm Springs equals
(1)Edison's retail price less (2) all costs avoided by not retailing the product
plus (3) any new costs caused by providing the input to the competitors. In
other words, the correct price is the final product price minus the service
provider's net avoided costs specific to that sale.
These prices can be determined by using a straightforward
analytical framework based on five elements of cost:
1. Long-run incremental costs for generation services
("generation LRIC");
2. Long-run incremental costs for the provision of network
transmission services ("network LRIC");
3. Long-run incremental costs for performing retail marketing
functions ("retail marketing LRIC");
4. Long-run incremental costs for performing wholesale
marketing functions ("wholesale marketing LRIC"); and,
5. The earnings specified under regulation as necessary to
provide recovery of common costs from provision of all
services.
Using the "bottoms up" approach, the correct wholesale price
equals the general LRIC (item one) plus network transmission LRIC (item
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two) plus the wholesale marketing LRIC (item four) plus the opportunity
costs of wholesaling (item five). Equivalently, using the "tops down"
approach, the correct wholesale price equals the retail price plus the
wholesale marketing LRIC (item four) minus the retail marketing LRIC
(item three).
If the City self-supplied its power needs (e.g., through its
designated partner, say Enron) and requested transmission of that power
from point of origin to multiple low-voltage receipt points, the CPP price
using the "bottoms up" approach equals the network transmission LRIC
(item two) plus the wholesale marketing LRIC (item four) plus the
opportunity costs of wholesaling (item five). Using the "tops down"
approach, the wholesale price it should pay for that transmission equals the
retail price plus the wholesale marketing LRIC (item four) minus the retail
marketing LRIC (item three) minus the generation LRIC (item one).
V. CONCLUSION
Our discussion illustrates the case for restructuring existing
transmission tariffs to ensure that they are "non-bypassable." In most cases,
wholesale tariffs have been designed without consideration of opportunity
costs; when they do not include opportunity costs they are deficient as they
fail to achieve the basic objectives of productive efficiency and Pareto
optimality. If wholesale transmission tariffs are restructured following the
rules espoused here then the need for transition charges would be reduced.
Such charges would be required only in the case of stand-alone entry.
If wholesale transmission tariffs cannot be modified, the
Commission should take action to prevent bypass of transition charges
adopted by state commissions. Such fees when added to cost-based access
charges would provide the necessary condition for productive efficiency
and the Pareto improvement criterion to be achieved. Granting wholesale
transmission access as strictly incremental cost-based rates and allowing
buyers to use the municipality exemptions undermines state and federal
cost recovery objectives. As Mr. Homan suggested, the name of the game
will be bypass, the monopolies will bleed from all arteries, but consumers
will ultimately pay.
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